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CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND BANKRUPTCY

By

CHARLES

E.

NADLER*

In the field of Georgia Corporation Law some changes of significance
were made during the survey year by amendments to the Corporation Act of
1938' and in the public revenue laws relating to the rate and method of
computation of corporate taxes.2
The 1949 and i95o amendments to the various corporation statutes of

Georgia affect not only the private corporation, but also the banking, the
insurance, and the railroad company. All types of private corporations
are involved in two changes in the taxation laws, in that (i) the rate of
taxation was raised from five and one half to seven per cent,3 and (2)
the method of computation of income taxes to be paid was changed.' So,
too, are all types of corporations interested in the amendment' that now
authorizes the execution of all stock certificates by the facsimile, and not
necessarily the original, signatures of its appropriate officers.
Insurance corporations are affected by the.amendments contained in Act
587' and in Act 513,' in that the former now expressly permits stock, as
well as mutual, insurance companies to provide for participation by their
policyholders in the net profits, and the latter raises their minimum capital
stock requirements from $25,000 to $100,000.
Banking corporations, by virtue of Act 5188 are now given greater latitude in the type of securities they may purchase and in the ratio thereof to
their capital stock and surplus.
Finally, Georgia railroad corporations that have reorganized under the
National Bankruptcy Act' now have the power" notwithstanding the provisions of any other Georgia statutes, to adopt such amendments to their
charter, to make such changes in their authorized capitalization and to
issue such stocks, bonds and other corporate securities as may be necessary
and proper to put into effect and carry out such plan of reorganization and
such decrees and orders of the bankruptcy court relative thereto without
the need of formal action by the directors or the stockholders of such
railroad company.
As to the case-law for this last year no new or fundamental changes
have been wrought.
*Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; Author,
The Law of Bankruptcy (Callaghan & Co., 1948), Georgia Corporation Law:
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Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Sasser," decided July I1, 1949, involved a question of agency as applied to a corporation for liability for tort. This
case is worthy of comment because the Court of Appeals, in sustaining the
Richmond City Court in overruling a general demurrer to the petition,
distinguishes by factual refinements the established law of Georgia. The
court puts great weight on the allegation that "the facts being made
known to the Manager, the latter stated that the employee had been
trained to do just that and that he was supposed to watch the customers
and he was doing the right thing, however, apparently he had made a
mistake." Seemingly, this allegation was in line with previous holdings
that "the test of liability is, not whether the act was done during the
existence of the employment, but whether it was done within the scope
of the actual transaction of the master's business for accomplishing the
ends of his employment.' 2 Moreover, the further allegation that "as
plaintiff was leaving the defendant's store and was on a public street, in
the presence and hearing of numerous persons, an employee of the store
asked her what she had put in her pocket in the store and then searched
her pockets with his hands" was an allegation of assault or battery and
not of slander, even though elements of slander were involved. Accordingly, the restricted rules laid down by the Georgia courts relating to a
corporation's liability for the tort of slander were not here applicable,"
and the court distinguished this case from Woolf v. Colonial Stores. 4
Nor-did the fact that the assault or battery happened outside the store
and off the premises make the petition demurrable on authority of Southern
Ry. Co. v. Chambers,5 or any other case, because basically, it is a question
of fact for the jury to determine whether the assault was so closely connected with the authorized transaction of the company's business to render
.the company liable."
Chronologically speaking, the next case involving corporations was de-Cded by the Supreme Court on July 14, I949." This was a typical "class"
or "representative" suit by a group of minority stockholders against the
officers, directors and majority stockholders, involving the application of
the facts to the statutory restrictions" imposed upon minority stockholders'
suits. Particularly in issue were: (a) whether the plaintiff-minority had
first exhausted all efforts to obtain redress at the hands of the officers and
within the corporate set-up, and (b) whether they acted promptly in
bringing this suit. In affirming the Fulton Superior Court in its overruling
a general demurrer, the court held that three and one-half years was
not, as a matter of law, evidence of laches, nor were the alleged efforts
of the minority to obtain redress from the majority inadequate. This case
seems to be in line with the established corporation law of Georgia.
11. 79 Ga. App. 604, 54 S.E'.2d 719 (1949).
12. McGhee v. Kingman & Everett, Inc., 49 Ga. App. 767(2), 176 S.E. 55 (1934) ; Frazier v. Southern Ry. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 37 S.E. 2d 774 (1946).
13. Behre v. National Cash Register Co., 100 Ga. 213, 27 S.E. 986 (1897).
14. 76 Ga. App. 565, 46 S.E. 2d 620 (1948).
15. 126 Ga. 404, 55 S.E. 37 (1906).
16. Schwartz v. Nunnally, 60 Ga. App. 858, 5 S.E. 2d 91 (1939).
17. Mountain Manor Co. v. Greenoe, 205 Ga. 619, 54 S.E. 2d 629 (1949).
18. GA. CODE § 22-711 (1933).
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Next in the order of time comes the case of Mankin v. Bryant,'" decided
on November 14, 1949. This is an equity action involving specific perform-

ance of a promise to convey land. The corporation question is raised as to
the validity of a contract between incorporators executed before application
for the charter. Although the court recognized the established law"0 that
such a contract was not binding on the corporation or its directors unless
made a part of the application for charter, the court found that the
contract sought to be specifically performed was not a pre-incorporation
agreement but was in the nature of a duly passed resolution of the directors and stockholders passed subsequent to its organization.
On January 12, i95o, the Supreme Court decided Redwine v. Southern
Co.,2' the next case involving a corporation. Nothing new nor unusual was
presented in this controversy, except possibly the procedural aspects. The
action was initiated through declaratory judgment proceedings, and it was
on this point alone that the court split, four to three, in holding that the
declaratory judgment statute was applicable. In line with statutory language and established judicial interpretation thereof, the court found
that the constitutional provisions2 2 (exempting from ad valorem intangible
taxes common voting stock of a subsidiary corporation not doing business
in Georgia, if at least 90 per cent of such stock is owned by a Georgia
corporation with its principal place of business located in this State)
apply equally to a domestic, Georgia-created corporation and to a foreign,
Georgia-domesticated corporation. The Georgia statute 3 expressly provides that upon domestication, a foreign corporation and the stockholders
thereof "shall have the same powers, privileges, and immunities as similar
corporations created under the laws of this State .

.

.

."

Then, why

or
should not the constitutional exemption afforded domestic holding
24
parent corporations apply to domesticated foreign corporations ?
The Supreme Court considered Westbrook v. University of Georgia
Athleticl ss'n., Inc.2" Like its predecessor, Villyard v. Regents of University System of Georgia,2" the right of a non-profit corporation to operate
a laundry and dry-cleaning establishment was attacked by a group of local,
competitive operators. The only distinction between the two cases, Justice
Wyatt points out, is that in the J/illyard case, the Board of Regents itself operated the laundry while in the instant case, the Athletic Association of the University of Georgia conducted the business under a contract with the regents. The contention that since the Athletic Association
was a private, commercial corporation operated for profit, and that the
Board of Regents therefore could not lawfully delegate this power, was
answered by the court. First, since the Athletic Association's charter re19. 206 Ga. 120, 56 S.E. 2d 447 (1949).
20. Meeks v. Seawell, 198 Ga. 817, 33 S.E. 2d 150 (1945).
21. 206 Ga., 377, 57 S.E. 2d 194 (1950).
22. GA. CONST. Art. VII, § 1. 1 4, GA. CODE ANN. 2-5404 (1948 Rev.).
23. GA. CODE § 22-1601 (1933).
24. That the courts have not always so held, see Forrester v. Continental Gin Co., 67
Ga. App. 119, 19 S.E. 2d 807 (1942) and National Manufacture & Store Corp. v.
Head, 67 Ga. App. 114, 19 S.E.2d 566 (1942), involving the payment of occupational taxes.
25. 206 Ga. 667, 58 S.E. 2d 428 (1950).
26. 204 Ga. 517, 50 S.E. 2d 313 (1948).
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cites that the corporation will have no capital stock and that its object
was not pecuniary gain but the promotion of the physical and moral welfare of the student body, the Athletic Association is not a private, profit
corporation, and therefore, it is lawful for the regents to delegate this
power. Second, it was not here being decided that a different result would
be obtained even if the Association had been a private corporation operated for profit. The Fillyard case was of first impression on this question
in Georgia and contains a review of many jurisdictions. Its decision was
seemingly founded on the extensiveness of the powers and duties of the
regents, which, said an earlier case,-2 "Under the powers granted, it becomes necessary . . . to look for limitations, rather than for authority to
do specific acts . . . Limited only by their proper discretion and by the

Constitution and law of this State, they may exercise any power usually
granted to such corporations."
We may now consider the last case relating to corporations, Southwestern Railroad Co. v. Benton,23 decided by the Supreme Court on April
10, I95O. Here, again, is nothing new in corporation law; nor is the de-

cision at variance with the established law of Georgia. In spite of Justice
Atkinson's dissenting opinion (which is contrary to the general law of
corporations 2 ), there should no longer be any question that the charter

of a corporation is a contract between the state and the corporation as
well as a contract between the corporation and its stockholders, and between the stockholders inter sese. Of interest in this case is the fact that
the charter here in question was granted by the state prior to January i,
1863, and at a time before the state had reserved unto itself the power
to alter, change, modify or amend corporate charters. Accordingly, and
because a sale of its entire assets had the effect of a vital, fundamental
change in the rights of its stockholders, any such change or modification
re.uired the unanimous consent of its stockholders.
PARTNERSHIPS

In the field of Georgia Partnership Law, there seems to be no new
statutes nor amendments to present statutes passed by the legislature in
1949 and 195o.

The case-law for this period of time is reflected in the seven following
cases :
Chronologically, first is the case of Grogan v. Herrington," decided
June 29, 1949. In affirming the Crisp Superior Court, the Court of Appeals (except for the dissent by Judge Felton) held it proper to arrest
and set aside a judgment because the suit purported to be against an alleged
partnership while the verdict and judgment were taken against the only partner served individually, and not against the alleged partnership. Accordingly, the verdict and judgment were at variance with the suit as laid, and
since a motion to vacate and set aside a judgment is addressed to the sound
27.
28.
29.
30.

State of Georgia v. Regents of University System, 179 Ga. 210, 175 S.E. 567 (1934).
206 Ga. 770, 58 S.E. 2d 905 (1950).
72 A.L.R. 1249 (1930).
79 Ga. App. 505, 54 S.E. 2d 284 (1949), 1 MERCER L. Rkv. 319 (1950).
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discretion of the trial court, "under the record here presented and the
law applicable hereto, we are of the opinion that the trial judge did not
err or abuse his discretion in vacating and setting aside the verdict and
judgment in this case." Judge Felton, however, takes the majority of
the court to task because it actually went o u t s i d e the r e c o r d by
considering the brief of evidence, which, as has been held in De Coff v.
Neuman, "' "is not a part of the record." Moreover, objects Judge Felton,
the effect of the majority opinion on the partnership law of Georgia is
all wrong in that it is not the law of Georgia that where a judgment is
entered against a partnership and also against the partner served, or where
a judgment is against the partnership alone and execution is issued against
the partner served, the partner has the legal right to require that partnership assets be exhausted before his individual property can be seized and
applied on the partnership debt. That may be the law in Colorado and
elsewhere, but not in Georgia, citing the old case of Drucker & Bro. v.
JJellhouse & Sons, 2 because, he insists, "The rule applied by the majority is an equitable rule which can only be invoked in equity by creditors of
the partnership and individual partners [and not by the individual partner himself] . .. In Georgia alone, of the states of the Union, does a judgment against a firm in the firm name ipso facto authorize the immediate
issuance of an execution against the property of an individual [Citations]."
The second in sequence of time was Davis v. Hunter & Co.,33 decided July
12, 1949. In affirming the Civil Court of Fulton County, the Court of
Appeals followed the established law relating to admissions of one who
denies being a partner. Where such admissions, written or oral, tend to
show that the defendants were joint owners of the partnership property,
they are admissible to prove him such. In this case, the alleged partners
had executed and delivered to the RFC applications for loans which were
signed by them as partners, and the court insisted that these applications
so signed were admissions against interest and were admissible toward
proving the existence of the partnership.
The third case in chronological order was Adler v. Leopold Idler Co.,34
decided September i6, 1949. In affirming the judgment of the Chatham
Superior Court, the Supreme Court merely reiterated the principle that "a
court of equity will not relieve a party [one partner against the others in
an accounting upon dissolution] from the injurious consequences of his
own act, upon the theory that he acted on a mistake of fact, when such
party by reasonable diligence could have ascertained the truth."
The fourth case was Philips v. Bowen,"3 decided November 15, 1949.
In affirming the judgment of the Monroe County Superior Court, the Supreme Court restated the principle that where a judgment in a suit by one
partner against the other for injunction, accounting, receivership and dissolution of partnership conformed to the issues made by the pleadings, the
defendant had no right, and the court had no power, to amend the judg31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

79 Ga. App. 162, 54 S.E. 2d 134 (1949).
82 Ga. 129, 8 S.E. 40, 2 L.R.A. 328 (1888).
79 Ga. App. 624, 54 S.E. 2d 725 (1949).
205 Ga. 818, 55 S.E. 2d 139 (1949).
206 Ga. 268, 56 S.E. 2d 503 (1949).
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ment, after the expiration of the term, where matters sought by such
amendment concerned things which occurred subsequently to said judgment and matters that could have been determined on trial. It appeared
that at the term of court subsequent to the term at which the judgment
had been entered, the trial court, before entering a final decree providing
for the distribution of the assests of the partnership by virture of a sale
by the receiver, had a hearing on the objections of the one party to the final
report and had approved the final report of the receiver and had entered
a final decree as to the distribution of the partnership assets in accordance
with the verdict and judgment previously rendered. The previous judgment set forth the respective value of each partner's interest in the partnership assets upon which the ratio of final distribution was based, and it
could not be modified or amended at a later term of court.
The fifth case was Walker v. Sheehan," decided December 2, 1949. In reversing the Richmond County Superior Court, the Court of Appeals again
emphasized that there is a difference in legal status of an individual and
of a partnership which includes such individual as a member thereof. Here,
a libel suit was begun by Sheehan as an individual and there was no intimation that he sued otherwise than as an individual. Allowing him subsequently to amend his petition by joining another person as party plaintiff and making the action by the two an action as partners was error.
This principle of law is in line with the established law of Georgia, and is
distinguished from the accepted proposition that "in suits by partners of
any two or more persons where the name of anyone who ought to have been
joined is ommitted, the same may on motion be inserted instanter."37
Davis v. Holloway,33 decided on March io, i95o, was the sixth partnership case. In sustaining the demurrer granted by the Superior Court of
Richmond County, the Court of Appeals followed the established principle of law most recently announced by it in the Adler v. Leopold Adler
case, to the effect that "a court of equity will relieve for mistakes
of fact, but does not relieve for ignorance where the party complaining
could have knowledge of the truth by reasonable diligence." Accordingly,
a petition which alleged that the plaintiff, a surviving partner, had purchased his deceased partner's undivided interest from his estate and heirs, and
had thereafter discovered that the deceased partner had withdrawn a large
sum of money in excess of his share of earnings, but which did not allege
any misrepresentation, fraud or deceit, stated no ground for equitable relief on the theory that the legal representative of the estate received
money which in equity and good conscience belonged to the surviving partner.
The last case involving partnerships was Reisman v. Massey,39 decided
March 17, i95o. The plaintiff sued a husband and wife as partners on a
real estate brokerage contract under seal signed only by the wife. Recovery was denied in the trial court and this was affirmed on appeal. The Court
of Appeals held that no recovery could be had against a partnership in a
36.
37.
38.
39.

80 Ga. App. 606, 56 S.E.
Blackwell v. Pennington
81 Ga. App. 158, 58 S.E.
81 Ga. App. 277, 58 S.E.

2d 628 (1949).
& Sons, 66 Ga. 240, 241 (1880).
2d 234 (1950).
2d 528 (1950).
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suit on an instrument under seal, signed by one partner in his individual
capacity only, unless the other partner was stricken by amendment.
BANKRUPTCY

In the field of bankruptcy, the only recent Georgia case was Allen v.
Community Loan & Investment Co.,4" decided February 24, i95o. In affirming the Civil Court of Fulton County, the Court of Appeals reiterated a
well-established principle of bankruptcy law in holding that "a discharge in
bankruptcy relieved the defendants of their debt, but did not discharge the
lien against the property involved" since the lien of a mortgage or of a
bill of sale to secure debt is not waived nor lost by the taking of a general judgment; the discharge has no effect on such lien, and it makes no
difference whether the property so affected has been listed in the bankruptcy schedules or not. The only way such a lien or mortgage may be vacated is through foreclosure proceedings,, in or out of the bankruptcy proceedings, or, of course, through an express voluntary release thereof by the
lienor or mortgagee.
40.

81 Ga. App. 65, 57 S.E. 2d 703 (1950).

